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Abstract 29 
When an image is presented to one eye and a very different image is presented to the 30 
corresponding location of the other eye, they compete for conscious representation, such that 31 
only one image is visible at a time while the other is suppressed. Called binocular rivalry, this 32 
phenomenon and its deviants have been extensively exploited to study the mechanism and neural 33 
correlates of consciousness. In this paper, we propose a framework, the unconscious binding 34 
hypothesis, to distinguish unconscious processing from conscious processing. According to this 35 
framework, the unconscious mind not only encodes individual features but also temporally binds 36 
distributed features to give rise to cortical representation, but unlike conscious binding, such 37 
unconscious binding is fragile. Under this framework, we review evidence from psychophysical 38 
and neuroimaging studies, which suggests that: (1) for invisible low level features, prolonged 39 
exposure to visual pattern and simple translational motion can alter the appearance of subsequent 40 
visible features (i.e. adaptation); for invisible high level features, although complex spiral motion 41 
cannot produce adaptation, nor can objects/words enhance subsequent processing of related 42 
stimuli (i.e. priming), images of tools can nevertheless activate the dorsal pathway; and (2) 43 
although invisible central cues cannot orient attention, invisible erotic pictures in the periphery 44 
can nevertheless guide attention, likely through emotional arousal; reciprocally, the processing of 45 
invisible information can be modulated by attention at perceptual and neural levels.  46 
 47 
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superior colliculus; STS, superior temporal sulcus; V1 (2, 3, 4, 5, 7, and 8), visual cortical area1(2, 59 
3, 4, 5, 7, and 8); V3A, V3 accessory 60 
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1. Introduction 91 
In everyday life, our two eyes usually receive similar inputs from visual environment. What if 92 
each of the two eyes views dissimilar images, as illustrated in Fig. 1? Rather than melding into 93 
a stable composite, the two images rival for visibility, with one temporarily dominating 94 
perception for seconds and being replaced in dominance by the other in turn (Fig. 1a). This 95 
perceptual illusion is binocular rivalry (BR, for a review see Blake, 2001). According to Wade 96 
(1998), BR was first reported by Porta in 1593, who viewed different pages from two books 97 
with a partition between his two eyes.  98 
 99 
[insert figure 1 about here] 100 
 101 
Recently, there is growing interest in using BR to explore the dynamical properties of visual 102 
awareness and its neural concomitants (for a review, see Tong et al., 2006). The neural correlates 103 
of consciousness are defined by Koch (2004, p. 16) as “the minimal set of neuronal events and 104 
mechanisms jointly sufficient for a specific conscious percept”. Fundamental to this quest is to 105 
understand the neural correlates of processing with and without awareness. In other words, if the 106 
two experimental conditions differ only in awareness with sensory inputs kept constant, then the 107 
neural differences between the two conditions should correlate with awareness. Unlike backward 108 
masking or crowding, wherein awareness is manipulated by changing visual stimulation (e.g. 109 
timing and spacing, respectively), in BR, visual stimulation is invariant yet the observer’s 110 
conscious state is continually in flux (for a review of different psychophysical techniques for 111 
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manipulating visual awareness, see Kim and Blake, 2005). Moreover, some limitations of BR in 112 
studying the neural correlates of awareness, such as unpredictable switches in perception and 113 
relatively short suppression duration, can be surmounted by a recent technique derived from 114 
rivalry—continuous flash suppression (CFS, Fang and He, 2005; Tsuchiya and Koch, 2005). In 115 
CFS, a series of different, contour-rich, high-contrast patterns are continuously flashed to one 116 
eye at about 10 Hz to suppress information presented to the other eye (Fig. 1b). CFS is effective 117 
and reliable in suppressing even highly salient images throughout a relatively long viewing 118 
period, sometimes longer than 3 minutes; as a comparison, visual masking renders visible 119 
information invisible by presenting the stimuli less than 33 ms to establish objective 120 
unawareness (Box 1). Such a long period of subliminal processing in CFS might produce robust 121 
behavioral and neurophysiological effects, such as priming and subliminal conditioning. On the 122 
other hand, CFS entails deeper suppression than BR does. For example, when measured with 123 
gratings in a probe detection task, the contrast increment thresholds of CFS and BR (vs. 124 
non-rivalry conditions) are 1.4 log-units and 0.5 log-units, respectively (Tsuchiya et al., 2006). 125 
For these reasons, CFS, albeit new, is now widely used to suppress visual stimuli from awareness 126 
(Bahrami et al., 2007; Fang and He, 2005; Gilroy and Blake, 2005; Jiang et al., 2006; Jiang et al., 127 
2007; Jiang and He, 2006; Moradi et al., 2005; Pasley et al., 2004; Tsuchiya and Koch, 2005; 128 
Yang et al., 2007). The main finding is that weak signal that fails in the competition for 129 
conscious representation can still produce significant behavioral effects and neural activations. 130 
 131 
One of the central questions in interocular suppression (i.e. the suppression of an image from 132 
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awareness by BR or CFS) and consciousness in general, is the processing level of suppressed 133 
information. In other words, what is the fate of unconscious information and where does it 134 
reach within the brain? This is an essential question to consciousness because it constraints the 135 
distinction between consciousness and unconsciousness. If unconscious information cannot be 136 
processed at all regardless of how it is rendered invisible (i.e. it is as if no information is 137 
presented), this would prove that consciousness and unconsciousness are profoundly different at 138 
the earliest stage and easy to distinguish at both behavioral and neural levels. If, on the other 139 
hand, unconscious information is processed to the same extent as conscious information in the 140 
brain except for conscious state, this would imply that the only difference between 141 
consciousness and unconsciousness is human subjective experiences. As one can imagine, the 142 
real story is much more complicated than the two extremes: unconscious information can be 143 
processed to some extent contingent on factors such as the types of stimuli and attentional 144 
resources.  145 
 146 
We propose that the brain not only can encode invisible features (orientation, motion direction, 147 
etc.) but also can temporally bind distributed invisible features to give rise to cortical 148 
representation, although such unconscious binding is fragile. In the sessions to follow, we will 149 
first briefly review the scope and limits of unconscious processing during BR/CFS (see Kouider 150 
and Dehaene, 2007 for a review on visual masking) to advocate our theoretical framework: the 151 
unconscious binding hypothesis. Then we will discuss in details the depth of invisible 152 
information processing for different types of information, ranging from features, objects, tools, 153 
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faces, to affective information. This will be followed by a discussion of the functional role 154 
(especially attentional guidance) of invisible information, and how invisible processing can be 155 
modulated by top-down attention. Finally, we will close the article with the take-home 156 
messages from this area of research.  157 
 158 
[insert box 1 about here] 159 
 160 
2. A theoretical framework 161 
Imagine that a triangle or a square is presented so briefly that you feel you are unable to see it, 162 
yet if you are forced to choose one of the two, your accuracy in guessing the identity of the 163 
image might nevertheless be significantly better than chance level. To probe the scope of 164 
processing without awareness, we need to establish chance performance during such 165 
forced-choice procedure. This might seem paradoxical: how can humans be affected by stimuli 166 
that “absolutely” cannot be perceived? The central idea of perception without consciousness 167 
lies in that during the multiple stages of processing, consciousness emerges only after elaborate 168 
perceptual processing (Erdelyi, 1974). When the processing stages that give rise to 169 
consciousness are interrupted, information is processed unconsciously to a certain degree 170 
contingent on factors such as stimulus saliency and attentional capacity. Theoretically, the ideal 171 
technique to characterize the depth of processing is to disrupt only the stage (s) prior to the 172 
emergence of consciousness. It is unclear, however, exactly which stage (s) and what parts of 173 
the brain that give rise to consciousness. A basic and fruitful approach is to probe the depth of 174 
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processing under unconscious state at both behavioral and neural levels. This is somewhat 175 
similar to how attention researchers tackle the debate of early vs. late selection in attention (i.e. 176 
whether attention exerts its modulation effect at an early sensory stage or at a late response 177 
stage)—the crux is to understand the processing fate of unattended stimuli (Kanwisher and 178 
Wojciulik, 2000; Lavie, 1995).  179 
 180 
What can BR and CFS tell us in this sense? BR is effective in blocking information from 181 
reaching awareness. Phenomenonally, observers are often unable to detect changes of a 182 
suppressed target unless those changes are accompanied by abrupt transient changes in 183 
luminance or contrast (Blake and Fox, 1974b; Blake et al., 1998). To assess visual sensitivity 184 
during suppression experimentally, Fox and colleagues developed the test-probe 185 
procedure—probes (i.e. targets) are briefly presented to an eye during either dominance or 186 
suppression phase to assess visual sensitivities to them (for a review, see Blake, 2001). They 187 
found that suppression entails a general, non-selective loss in visual sensitivity of the 188 
suppressed eye—probes presented in the suppressed eye are more difficult to detect than those 189 
in the dominant eye (Wales and Fox, 1970), even when the probes differ significantly from the 190 
original suppressed stimuli (Fox and Check, 1968; Fox and Check, 1972).  191 
 192 
To evaluate what can be processed under suppression, besides the test-probe procedure, 193 
researchers tap into several techniques including adaptation (Box 2) and priming (i.e. prior 194 
experience increases sensitivity to subsequent related stimuli). To what extent can interocularly 195 
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suppressed information be processed? The results are mixed. After adaptation, some behavioral 196 
aftereffects (AEs) (for an introduction to a variety of visual aftereffects, see Box 3), especially 197 
low-level AEs (e.g. pattern and translational motion AEs), can be largely preserved during 198 
interocular suppression under certain conditions; certain brain areas, particularly the amygdala 199 
and dorsal cortical areas, exhibit robust activities for fearful faces and tools, respectively, as 200 
measured by functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). Other behavioral AEs and priming 201 
effects, however, are severely disturbed, especially high-level AEs (e.g. complex motion and 202 
face identity AEs), semantic priming, and cueing information. To explain the behavioral 203 
findings, especially why simple features, but not complex features and objects, can be 204 
processed, Blake (1997) proposed that 1) rivalry suppression disrupts the binding of local 205 
features into coherent, global representations; 2) suppression transpires within visual areas 206 
forming a pathway into the parietal lobe, several stages away from V1 (also known as primary 207 
visual cortex, striate cortex, or Brodmann's area 17), where local features are registered. A 208 
decade after this account was postulated, emerging studies especially those using fMRI have 209 
cumulated; some findings, however, cannot fit into this proposal and wait for theoretical 210 
understanding. For example, why behavioral studies fail to find object priming effect and face 211 
adaptation whereas fMRI studies show neural activity to objects and fearful faces in dorsal 212 
stream and the amygdala/ superior temporal sulcus (STS), respectively? This mirrors the 213 
complication of the depth of unconscious processing in BR. 214 
 215 
In this paper, we argue that both the conscious and unconscious minds face the binding problem 216 
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(Treisman, 1996): since different visual features are processed by functionally distinct neural 217 
pathways and brain areas (Livingstone and Hubel, 1988; Felleman and Van Essen, 1991), how 218 
does the brain subsequently match the correct features (e.g. a red bar moving rightward and a 219 
green bar moving leftward) and how does it know which features belong to which objects (e.g. 220 
a red apple as red, with a yellow banana as yellow but not the reverse)? It has been proposed 221 
that solutions to the perceptual binding problem could take place at two different stages of 222 
visual processing: an early and automatic binding based on spatiotemporal concurrence 223 
(Holcombe and Cavanagh, 2001) and a late, object-based mechanism mediated by attention to 224 
bind distributed features to correctly form coherent object representations (Treisman, 1999; 225 
Wolfe and Cave, 1999). We propose here that binding during unconscious processing is 226 
possible, albeit fragile: the brain can associate, group, or bind certain features in an invisible 227 
scene to form certain cortical representation, and such binding can be detected under optimal 228 
conditions. Although it remains to be determined in which circumstances can early binding and 229 
late binding occur unconsciously, we speculate that early binding is automatic if attention is 230 
paid and that late binding can occur if different features are strongly represented and attention is 231 
sufficiently allocated to them (cf. Melcher and Vidnyanszky, 2006). Under this framework, we 232 
review evidence from unconscious processing of low-level visual features (e.g. orientation, 233 
spatial frequency), and then proceed to high level visual categories (e.g. objects, tools, and 234 
faces), affective and attentive processing. In the following, the scope and limits of unconscious 235 
processing in interocular suppression will be discussed and organized in five themes: 1) feature 236 
analysis; 2) object (semantic) processing; 3) emotional processing; 4) attentional guidance by 237 
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invisible information; and 5) attentional modulation of invisible information processing. 238 
 239 
[insert box 2 about here] 240 
 241 
3. The scope and limits of unconscious processing during binocular rivalry 242 
3.1. Feature analysis 243 
To what extent are cortical areas (e.g. V1) supporting feature analysis spared during interocular 244 
suppression and thus not directly involved in consciousness (Crick and Koch, 1995; Lin, 2008)? 245 
At one extreme all basic features (orientation, spatial frequency, etc.) can be processed in 246 
suppressed condition to the same extent as in dominant condition, and thus the cortical areas 247 
supporting such feature analysis are not directly involved in consciousness (all-exemption 248 
hypothesis). At the other extreme, no basic feature can be processed no matter what, and thus all 249 
responsible cortical areas are involved in consciousness (null-exemption hypothesis). An 250 
intermediate position is that when suppressed features can be processed but to a lesser extent 251 
depending on the type of the features, and thus underlying cortical areas are involved in 252 
consciousness (partial-exemption hypothesis). The critical test is to characterize the levels of 253 
perceptual and neural processing across a range of features under suppressed and dominant 254 
conditions.  255 
 256 
The null-exemption hypothesis is unambiguously falsified by behavioral adaptation studies, as 257 
summarized in Table 1. Early studies show that, under some conditions, interocular suppression 258 
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does not reduce the strengths of AEs after adaptation to a variety of low-level features 259 
(definitions of AEs mentioned in the following are provided in Box 3): tilted lines (tilt AE, 260 
Wade and Wenderoth, 1978), squarewave gratings (spatial frequency AE, including contrast 261 
threshold elevation and spatial frequency shift, Blake and Fox, 1974a), McCollough-type 262 
gratings (orientation-contingent color AE, White et al., 1978), and translational motion (motion 263 
AE, Lehmkuhle and Fox, 1975; O'Shea and Crassini, 1981). Is this evidence for the 264 
all-exemption hypothesis, that the neural basis of these AEs, such as V1 and MT+, are not 265 
directly related to visual awareness? The critical test to tease apart the all-exemption hypothesis 266 
and the partial-exemption hypothesis is to clarify the relative strengths of AE after adaptation to 267 
suppressed and dominant stimuli. Two recent studies provide behavioral evidence for the 268 
partial-exemption hypothesis: the strength of negative AI after adaptation to suppressed (vs. 269 
visible) oriented gratings was significantly weaker during BR (Gilroy and Blake, 2005) and 270 
CFS (Tsuchiya and Koch, 2005). Moreover, monkey single-unit recordings (Leopold and 271 
Logothetis, 1996; Sheinberg and Logothetis, 1997), human electroencephalogram recordings 272 
(Cobb et al., 1967; Lansing, 1964), and functional neuroimaging (Haynes et al., 2005; Lee et al., 273 
2005; Lumer et al., 1998; Polonsky et al., 2000; Tong and Engel, 2001; Wunderlich et al., 2005) 274 
show robust awareness-dependent modulations in V1—neural events in V1 are attenuated in 275 
response to suppressed (vs. dominant) visual stimuli. Thus, these studies demonstrate that V1 is 276 
directly involved in visual awareness, supporting the partial-exemption hypothesis (Lin, 2008). 277 
How to reconcile the discrepancy between the behavioral adaptation and neurophysiological 278 
studies? Blake et al., (2006) provided a nice resolution to this debate (Figure 2). This study taps 279 
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into the finding that some visual AEs depend critically on the contrast of the adaptor, with the 280 
strength of adaptation saturating at moderate to high contrast levels (Figure 2a). Critically, 281 
full-strength AEs observed in previous studies might only hold for high contrast adaptor. Indeed, 282 
using high contrast adaptors, Blake et al., (2006) replicated previous studies; however, using 283 
low contrast adaptors, they showed that interocular suppression did weaken the strength of 284 
threshold elevation AE and motion AE (Figure 2c-d). This implies that at least some of the 285 
neural events underlying rivalry suppression transpire before or at the site(s) of threshold 286 
elevation and motion adaptation. Presumably, the neural mechanisms of threshold elevation and 287 
motion AEs are closer than those of AEs that are not modulated by awareness to the neural 288 
correlates of consciousness.  289 
 290 
[insert figure 2 about here] 291 
 292 
Further support for the partial-exemption hypothesis calls for evidence that some (presumably 293 
complex) features might not be processed at all when suppressed. Motion AE (MAE) is an 294 
excellent candidate for testing this idea because of its rich variety. As mentioned above, 295 
translational (i.e. linear) MAE is largely spared during suppression, similar to the finding of 296 
preserved motion priming after suppression (Blake et al., 1999). Importantly, however, 297 
Wiesenfelder and Blake (1990) did observe that the duration of spiral AE after adaptation to 298 
spiral was proportional to the total duration of spiral visibility during adaptation, similar to the 299 
disruption of the drifting plaid-induced MAE during suppression (van der Zwan et al., 1993). 300 
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Further evidence comes from illusory AE: subjective (i.e. illusory) contour AE (van der Zwan 301 
and Wenderoth, 1994) and square-wave illusion AE (Blake and Bravo, 1985), which are 302 
believed to arise from intercortical interactions in early visual areas (e.g. V1 and V2, Lee and 303 
Nguyen, 2001), are also disrupted during suppression. Thus, some complex features such as 304 
spiral, drifting plaid, illusory contour, and square-wave illusion are almost completely disrupted 305 
during interocular suppression. 306 
 307 
The picture that emerges from these adaptation studies is that all visual features can be 308 
modulated by visual awareness to different degrees. Processing of basic features (e.g. tilts and 309 
simple motions) is modulated by visual awareness to a lesser extent than processing of complex 310 
features (e.g. complex motions); when contrast of basic features is high, such processing can be 311 
even exempted from modulation by consciousness. In neural terms, V1 feature analyzers, albeit 312 
inhibited to a certain extent, are largely responsive to suppressed visual features compared with 313 
later visual areas (such as MT+). This suggests that interocular suppression occurs at early 314 
stages of processing and increases at later cortical stages, as elaborated in the following sections. 315 
A more complete picture entails moving beyond feature analysis to examine the processing of 316 
higher level visual inputs. 317 
 318 
[insert box 3 about here] 319 
 320 
[insert table 1 about here] 321 
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 322 
3.2. Object and semantic processing 323 
To what extent can objects and semantic information be processed unconsciously? Given that 324 
complex features are deeply suppressed during BR (see 3.1. Feature analysis), it seems that 325 
object representation and semantic analysis are almost impossible. Indeed, accumulating 326 
evidence suggests 1) that the face identity-specific AE observed in visible condition is 327 
effectively cancelled by interocular suppression (Moradi et al., 2005), 2) that pictorial object 328 
priming in a naming task can be found only for stimuli that are processed sufficiently to be 329 
identified in the priming stage (Cave et al., 1998), and 3) that word-priming effect in a 330 
word/non-word decision task can be measurable only if the observers consciously perceive the 331 
prime words (Zimba and Blake, 1983). These observations raise an intriguing question 332 
regarding the neural basis of the disruption of object processing and semantic priming during 333 
suppression. According to Lamme and Roelfsema (2000), it seems that encoding of simple 334 
features (e.g., spatial frequency) is hardwired and occurs without awareness when information 335 
first enters early visual cortex in a feedforward sweep. These features are then attentively 336 
grouped to enter consciousness through recurrent processing, by means of horizontal 337 
connections and feedforward/feedback projections. Built on this, there are two possible 338 
accounts for the disruption of object processing and semantic priming: one account suggests 339 
that all basic visual features of objects are processed to some extent, with the disruption due to 340 
inefficient attentive grouping or recurrent processing (i.e. grouping disruption account); the 341 
other account, which we favors, maintains that some critical features of objects are disrupted, 342 
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such that binding/grouping is impossible simply because of missing critical features, in 343 
conjunction with potential grouping inefficiency (i.e. feature disruption account). The latter 344 
account is consistent with our unconscious binding framework; binding is possible during 345 
unconscious processing if critical features can be registered and attentively grouped. To date, 346 
there is no convincing evidence regarding this issue. Below, we discuss some recent advances 347 
regarding the neural representation of object and semantic information during suppression. Note 348 
that this approach is descriptive rather than explanatory because it cannot falsify either the 349 
grouping disruption account or the feature disruption account. 350 
 351 
The current state-of-the-art regarding the mechanisms of BR is that interocular suppression per 352 
se occurs at early stages of processing (e.g. the lateral geniculate nucleus (LGN), Haynes et al., 353 
2005; V1, Polonsky et al., 2000) and increases at subsequent cortical stages in both the ventral 354 
(form) and the dorsal (motion) pathways, possibly due to cumulative lateral competition 355 
(Nguyen et al., 2003). In particular, neural activity within object-selective areas in the ventral 356 
pathway, especially the inferotemporal cortex (IT)1, is almost completely suppressed (Sheinberg 357 
and Logothetis, 1997; Tong et al., 1998). The IT plays an important role in both object 358 
recognition and semantic processing. First, the IT is critical for object recognition in non-human 359 
primates and humans. In primates, the IT codes complex objects and is responsible for view- 360 
                                                        
1 The inferotemporal cortex (IT) is composed of the middle temporal gyrus and inferior temporal gyrus in humans. 
Although the inferior temporal cortex may indicate the ventral part of the inferotemporal cortex in humans, most 
people do not care about this point, and both terms are used interchangeably (K. Tanaka, personal communication, 
November 26, 2007). 
N
at
ur
e 
Pr
ec
ed
in
gs
 : 
hd
l:1
01
01
/n
pr
e.
20
08
.2
24
6.
1 
: P
os
te
d 
29
 A
ug
 2
00
8
Page 18 of 86 
 
and position-invariant object representations (Tanaka, 1996; Ungerleider and Mishkin, 1982). In 361 
humans, the IT, which comprises the ventral surface of the human brain, extending from around 362 
the occipito-temporal border to the middle part of the temporal cortex (Tanaka, 1997), is also 363 
vital for object perception, as demonstrated by numerous studies such as those using fMRI 364 
adaptation—the observation of decreased neural activity for repeated versus novel stimuli 365 
(Grill-Spector et al., 2006; for an overview, see Box 2). For example, repetition priming for 366 
objects is observed in mid-levels of the neural processing hierarchy, including extrastriate 367 
visual cortex extending into the IT and left dorsal prefrontal cortex, but not early visual areas or 368 
motor areas (Buckner et al., 1998). The disruption of object priming effect during BR, therefore, 369 
might be due to the suppression of the ventral pathway, where the human homologue of the 370 
monkey IT is located. Second, the IT also plays an important role in semantic processing: the 371 
semantic neural network extends from left inferior frontal cortex into the IT lobe, and includes 372 
occipital cortex and the fusiform gyrus (Tyler et al., 2001). Although with backward masking 373 
several studies have observed object recognition priming, or word priming, or both (Dehaene et 374 
al., 2001; Dehaene et al., 2004; Dell'Acqua and Grainger, 1999; Devlin et al., 2004; Gaillard et 375 
al., 2006; Kiefer and Brendel, 2006; Naccache et al., 2005; Nakamura et al., 2005), these 376 
findings are probably due to incomplete disruption of the IT. For example, IT neurons in the 377 
macaque monkeys retain substantial information about the target images despite visual masking 378 
(Rolls et al., 1999).  379 
 380 
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Although the proposal that interocular suppression deepens in later stages (Nguyen et al. 2003) 381 
receives large amounts of evidence in the ventral pathway as reviewed above, it is not clear 382 
whether the same holds for the dorsal pathway. In particular, the functional organization of the 383 
visual pathways in the cerebral cortex comprises not only the ventral “vision-for-perception” (i.e. 384 
to obtain information about the features of objects) pathway but also the dorsal “vision-for-action” 385 
(i.e. to guide movements) pathway (Goodale and Milner, 1992). The ventral and dorsal pathways 386 
carry out different computations on visual information from the retina: the former recognizes an 387 
object independent of its size, momentary orientation, and position; the latter computes the 388 
absolute metrics of target objects in a frame of reference centered on specific effectors (i.e. 389 
egocentric coding). Failing to observe object/semantic priming effect and the disruption of 390 
ventral visual areas (e.g. the IT) during suppression, therefore, need not be interpreted that 391 
objects or words cannot be processed at all. In particular, although areas such as the lateral 392 
occipital complex (LOC) in the ventral pathway show preferential activation to images of objects 393 
(Malach et al., 1995), the dorsal pathway also has several object-sensitive areas, including 394 
V3A/V7 (Grill-Spector et al., 1998) and intraparietal sulcus (Grill-Spector et al., 2000). 395 
Importantly, the object-sensitive regions in the dorsal pathway differ from those in the ventral 396 
pathway—the dorsal object areas, presumably because of its important role in reaching and 397 
grasping, prefer manipulable objects such as man-made tools, which are commonly associated 398 
with specific hand movements (Chao and Martin, 2000). Thus tools are a unique category of 399 
objects and serve as an excellent candidate to test the level of object processing in the dorsal 400 
pathway. Using fMRI, Fang and He (2005) showed that dorsal cortical areas (including V3A, V7, 401 
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and part of the intraparietal areas) responded strongly to different types of visual objects 402 
suppressed by CFS, with stronger responses to images of tools than human faces (Figure 3). This 403 
study provides evidence that suppressed invisible images of tools can activate the dorsal pathway 404 
and fits nicely with the perception–action model (Goodale and Milner, 1992). The action 405 
interpretation is further reinforced by the observation that when the motion of a rival stimulus is 406 
consistent with self-generated actions during BR, such actions can extend the dominance 407 
durations and abbreviate the suppression durations of that stimulus (Maruya et al., 2007).  408 
 409 
[insert figure 3 about here] 410 
 411 
How to reconcile the discrepancy between ventral and dorsal activity to invisible objects? That 412 
ventral activity is almost abolished whereas dorsal activity is somehow preserved in interocular 413 
suppression might reflect the functional differences between the parvocellular (P) and 414 
magnocellular (M) channels, in terms of selectivity to spatial and temporal frequency, color, 415 
motion, and luminance contrast (Box 4). The P and M pathways are preferentially associated 416 
the ventral and dorsal cortical pathways, respectively. Such distinctions between the P and M 417 
pathways potentially form part of the anatomical basis of different sensitivity of interocular 418 
suppression in the ventral and dorsal pathways. It is proposed that rivalry transpires mainly in 419 
the P pathway with visual information in the M pathway escaping rivalry suppression (Carlson 420 
and He, 2000; He et al., 2005). Building on this sensitivity account, Fang and He (2005) 421 
suggested that the dorsal activation to images of tools might arise from the residual signal after 422 
N
at
ur
e 
Pr
ec
ed
in
gs
 : 
hd
l:1
01
01
/n
pr
e.
20
08
.2
24
6.
1 
: P
os
te
d 
29
 A
ug
 2
00
8
Page 21 of 86 
 
incomplete suppression in visual cortex or from subcortical projections. At least two important 423 
issues, however, remain unclear. The first issue concerns the functional significance of such 424 
dorsal activity for tools: what are the behavioral consequences and why? One approach to 425 
address this issue is to characterize the levels of representation for tools, using adaptation and 426 
priming methods. The second issue involves the neurophysiological origins of dorsal activity 427 
for invisible tool images: does tool information get to the dorsal pathway through V1, or 428 
subcortical projections, or both? Neither the grouping disruption account (i.e. suppression 429 
disrupts grouping of simple features of objects) nor the feature disruption account (i.e. 430 
suppression disrupts processing of critical features of objects) could disambiguate the 431 
subcortical vs. cortical origins, nor could the sensitivity account of P and M. It seems that such 432 
ambiguity of neurophysiological origins is a general issue in neuroscience and might reflect the 433 
complicated connections in the nervous system. For example, area MT receives not only inputs 434 
from V1, V2, and V3 (DeYoe and Van Essen, 1988), but also direct projection from the LGN in 435 
the macaque monkeys (Sincich et al., 2004). To distinguish subcortical and cortical 436 
contributions, several important questions warrant empirical investigations. First, if rivalry 437 
indeed transpires mainly in the P pathway but not the M pathway, then why? It’s unclear how P 438 
and M cells differ in this aspect, and how the cells within each pathway differ from each other. 439 
Given that the ventral pathway receives inputs from both P and M cells (Merigan and Maunsell, 440 
1993), it is reasonable to speculate, based on the P and M sensitivity account, that there should 441 
be some activity in the ventral pathway from M cells during interocular suppression. Second, 442 
how to isolate the interconnections between different areas in the brain? Such interconnection 443 
N
at
ur
e 
Pr
ec
ed
in
gs
 : 
hd
l:1
01
01
/n
pr
e.
20
08
.2
24
6.
1 
: P
os
te
d 
29
 A
ug
 2
00
8
Page 22 of 86 
 
makes it difficult to distinguish subcortical vs. cortical contributions as it is almost impossible 444 
to isolate subcortical contributions or cortical contributions from V1 for cortical activity in the 445 
dorsal pathway. Current neuropsychology research sheds little light on this issue. For instance, 446 
although blindsight patients with a lesion in V1 can display preserved visually based action, this 447 
is not direct evidence that subcortical pathways are sufficient for dorsal activity to invisible 448 
images of tools in the Fang and He study; it is just unlikely that V1 is totally damaged in these 449 
patients. Monkey lesions studies will help to resolve this issue. In humans, a possible approach 450 
might be to examine attentional modulation of dorsal activity to tools, and to elucidate and 451 
quantify the differences in attentional modulation of subcortical and cortical pathways (see 3.3. 452 
Face perception). 453 
 454 
In summary, behaviorally, object identification and semantic analysis are largely depleted during 455 
interocular suppression. Neural activity in the ventral pathway is almost completely disrupted; 456 
however, there is still considerate amount of activity in the dorsal pathway to images of some 457 
categories of objects, such as tools, which provides neural evidence for the neuropsychological 458 
observation of action without identification. That invisible images of tools can activate the dorsal 459 
pathway supports our unconscious binding hypothesis in that at least it suggests that certain 460 
features are bound to give rise to dorsal object-sensitive areas. 461 
 462 
[insert box 4 about here] 463 
 464 
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3.3. Face perception 465 
As a special category of objects, the face is processed differently from other categories of 466 
objects (Farah et al., 1998) with dedicated neural substrates (e.g. the fusiform face area, FFA, 467 
Kanwisher et al., 1997; the occipital face area, OFA, Halgren et al., 1999). Although activity in 468 
the FFA for suppressed faces is almost entirely abolished (Fang and He, 2005; Pasley et al., 469 
2004; Tong et al., 1998; but see Jiang and He, 2006), invisible fearful faces can robustly 470 
activate the left amygdala (Jiang and He, 2006; Pasley et al., 2004; Williams et al., 2004) and 471 
the STS (Jiang and He, 2006). For instance, using CFS, Jiang and He (2006) observed that 472 
visibility did not modulate activity for fearful faces but had a profound effect for neutral faces 473 
in the amygdala. Similarly, in the STS, activity was robust to invisible fearful faces but not to 474 
neutral faces. On the contrary, in the FFA, activity was still measurable, albeit much reduced, to 475 
both fearful and neutral faces. 476 
 477 
Reminiscent of the unclear origins of the dorsal activity for tools (see 3.2. Object and semantic 478 
processing) is the debate regarding whether activity in the amygdala to invisible fearful faces is 479 
due to projections from cortical or subcortical pathways. Accumulating evidence from both 480 
experimental animals and humans seems to favor the subcortical account. Rodents, for example, 481 
exhibit fear conditioning with auditory or visual stimuli without respective sensory cortex 482 
(Armony et al., 1997; Romanski and LeDoux, 1992). Similarly, blindsight patients with a lesion 483 
in V1 nevertheless exhibit residual abilities to detect and localize visual stimuli (Weiskrantz, 484 
1997) and recognize facial expressions (de Gelder et al., 1999); engagement in the latter task 485 
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activates the amygdala (Morris et al., 2001). Convergent evidence comes from healthy humans. 486 
For example, Morris et al. (1999) measured neural activity for two angry faces, one of which 487 
was associated with a burst of white noise through previous classical conditioning. When 488 
rendered invisible by backward masking with a neutral face, the conditioned angry face 489 
(compared with the unconditioned angry face) enjoyed increased connectivity among the right 490 
amygdala, the pulvinar, and the SC but decreased connectivity among the right amygdala, the 491 
fusiform, and the orbitofrontal cortex. When the conditioned angry face was visible, however, 492 
such co-variation disappeared. On the other hand, the left amygdala could not differentiate 493 
aware and unaware conditioned angry faces; its connectivity with the pulvinar and the SC 494 
showed no context-specific co-variation. These data suggest a subcortical pathway that enables 495 
invisible stimuli to access the amygdala. A further demonstration of subcortical but not cortical 496 
pathways’ involvement in invisible fearful face processing is provided by Pasley and colleagues 497 
(2004). They found that, invisible fearful faces (compared with non-face objects) activated the 498 
amygdala but not the IT, which suggests that rudimentary discrimination of certain complex 499 
visual patterns does not require a high-level cortical representation. 500 
 501 
However, competing evidence argues otherwise. For instance, anatomically the crucial link 502 
between the pulvinar and the amygdala has not been demonstrated in primates yet (Pessoa, 503 
2005). In addition, results from blindsight patients are ambiguous because in the same 504 
blindsight patients invisible information can also activate cortical areas. This alternative 505 
explanation renders it impossible to rule out the contribution of cortical pathways (e.g. 506 
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extrastriate areas) in processing fearful faces. For example, images of complex objects 507 
presented in the blind visual field activate several visual areas, including MT+/V5 to rotating 508 
spiral stimulus, and lateral occipital cortex (MT+/V5 and the LOC) and posterior fusiform 509 
gyrus (V4/V8) to coloured images of natural objects (Goebel et al., 2001). It is therefore 510 
desirable to see whether invisible fearful faces can activate the amygdala in blindsight patients 511 
with full lesions in visual pathways.  512 
 513 
How to tease the two accounts apart then? To tackle the cortical-subcortical debate, one 514 
approach is to use features that can distinguish cortical from subcortical processing. First, 515 
although anatomically both cortical and subcortical pathways terminate at the amygdala, they 516 
come with different transmission properties (Pessoa, 2005). For instance, in primates the IT 517 
(Nakamura et al., 1992; Stefanacci and Amaral, 2002), but not earlier visual cortical areas (Iwai 518 
and Yukie, 1987; Webster et al., 1991), slowly passes detailed information to the amygdala. On 519 
the contrary, information transmission in the retinotectal pathway (i.e. the 520 
retino-collicular-pulvinar-amygdala pathway, an important subcortical pathway which proceeds 521 
from the retina to the SC, posterior nuclei of the thalamus such as the pulvinar, and then onto 522 
the amygdala) is rapid and shallow (LeDoux, 2000). Critical to the current reasoning, this 523 
means that subcortical pathways are able to (relatively) surpass attentional modulation 524 
(Anderson et al., 2003; Vuilleumier et al., 2001) and visibility constraint (Morris et al., 1998; 525 
Whalen et al., 1998), but unable to analyze visual inputs in a fine-grained scale (Anderson et al., 526 
2003; Williams et al., 2004). It is observed, for example, that activity in the amygdala increased 527 
N
at
ur
e 
Pr
ec
ed
in
gs
 : 
hd
l:1
01
01
/n
pr
e.
20
08
.2
24
6.
1 
: P
os
te
d 
29
 A
ug
 2
00
8
Page 26 of 86 
 
significantly for happy versus neutral faces only when the faces were invisible (Williams et al., 528 
2004). Williams et al. argue that although the amygdala still encodes affective information from 529 
the face stimuli, it has a limited capacity to differentiate affective valence when it must rely on 530 
information from subcortical inputs. Second, spatial frequency is another feature that can 531 
potentially distinguish the cortical and subcortical projections (for a review, see Johnson, 2005). 532 
Specifically, the fusiform cortex favors high spatial frequency over low frequency face 533 
regardless of emotional expressions, whereas the amygdala favors low frequency over high 534 
frequency fearful faces. Evidence for the subcortical account comes from the observation that, 535 
critically, low frequency but not high frequency fearful faces could activate the pulvinar and the 536 
SC (Vuilleumier et al., 2003). Third, a controversial one is whether the susceptibility to 537 
attentional modulation may provide another tool to distinguish subcortical from cortical 538 
processing. Pessoa and colleagues forcefully argue that a strongly automatic process should be 539 
largely independent of attention, among other top-down factors including task context, 540 
interpretation, and visual awareness (Pessoa, 2005). Indeed, using fMRI Pessoa and colleagues 541 
(Pessoa et al., 2002a; Pessoa et al., 2002b) found that, if the task was sufficiently demanding, 542 
activity in the amygdala and other areas was modulated by attention even for visible emotional 543 
faces. When participants were totally unaware of the fearful faces that flashed for 33 ms, no 544 
differential activation was observed in the amygdala (Pessoa et al., 2006). Event-related 545 
potentials (ERP) studies provide complementary evidence for this attentional modulation 546 
argument. For example, a greater frontal positivity in response to arrays containing fearful faces, 547 
relative to neutral faces, was obtained about 100 ms after stimulus onset only under attended 548 
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condition (Eimer et al., 2003; Holmes et al., 2003). Pessoa and colleagues reason that, given the 549 
rich details contained in facial expressions, the critical pathway involved in processing 550 
emotional expressions is cortical, which starts from V1 to extrastriate cortex, the fusiform, the 551 
STS, the IT, and then to the amygdala. On the other hand, subcortical routes are insufficient to 552 
give rise to activity in the amygdala to invisible emotional faces. Thus, they argue for the 553 
cortical account. 554 
 555 
Although there is no consensus regarding which pathways are more responsible for processing 556 
invisible emotional expressions, we believe that accumulating evidence favors the subcortical 557 
account. In particular, before those studies showing attentional modulation of invisible emotional 558 
face processing can be taken as evidence against the subcortical argument, the assumption that a 559 
truly subcortical pathway should be automatic and free of attentional modulation needs to be 560 
grounded firmly. To us, this assumption has not been well supported. For example, although 561 
relative to cortical pathways, subcortical pathways are less susceptible to attentional modulation, 562 
they are still susceptible to attentional modulation (Kastner and Pinsk, 2004). Attention is 563 
regarded as the gatekeeper of sensory inputs: in vision, attention modulates neural activity as 564 
early as in the LGN (Chen et al., 1998; O'Connor et al., 2002) and the pulvinar (Kastner et al., 565 
2004; Robinson and Petersen, 1992); in audition, it starts as early as 20 ms after stimulus onset in 566 
auditory cortex (Woldorff et al., 1993). As such, attentional modulation should not be taken as 567 
evidence against the involvement of subcortical pathways in invisible emotion processing. More 568 
research is needed, though, to quantify attentional modulation of subcortical and cortical 569 
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processing. Moreover, the subcortical retinotectal pathway should be anatomically established in 570 
primates. It is likely that the relative contributions from cortical and subcortical routes are 571 
quantitative rather than mutually exclusive. 572 
 573 
In conclusion, interocular suppression disrupts ventral temporal activity for faces, but not 574 
amygdala activity for fearful faces. It is still a matter of debate, however, regarding the relative 575 
contributions of subcortical and cortical projections to amygdala activity for invisible fearful 576 
faces. Overall, accumulating evidence seems to favor the subcortical account, but more research 577 
is needed to quantify the relative contributions of the two pathways, and to elucidate whether 578 
subcortical inputs can be sufficient in processing invisible fearful faces. We speculate that 579 
unconscious detection of fearful expression might result from binding of critical features (e.g. 580 
month shape and eye shape), regardless of whether these critical features are conveyed through 581 
subcortical or cortical pathways, or both.  582 
 583 
3.4. Attentional guidance by invisible information 584 
As elaborated above, information kept out of consciousness can nevertheless enter into the 585 
brain and be processed at multiple stages, which raises an intriguing question about the 586 
functional and ecological significance of unconscious processing. For example, can 587 
unconscious information guide conscious processing? An important faculty of conscious 588 
processing is attention, the ability to focus on a small portion of behaviorally relevant 589 
information while filter out distracting information. Attention is fundamental to subsequent 590 
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processing, acting as an information-processing bottleneck, because at any single moment, our 591 
environment bombards us with far more information than can be consciously registered and 592 
effectively processed. It is thus intriguing to ask whether information suppressed during 593 
BR/CFS can influence allocation of visual attention. 594 
 595 
To address this, brain machinery in processing invisible information should be linked to its 596 
potential role in deploying attention. At neural level, although there is no evidence that invisible 597 
information can activate the frontoparietal network, which is important for controlling attention 598 
(for an overview of the neural mechanisms of top-down and bottom-up control of attention, see 599 
Box 5), there is evidence that invisible information can activate dorsal areas such as V3A, V7, 600 
and part of the intraparietal areas (Fang & He, 2005). Behaviorally, the possibility of attentional 601 
guidance by invisible information was first examined by Schall and colleagues (1993). In their 602 
study, a black dot was used as an orienting cue, which appeared on either the left or right side of 603 
the central small circle, signifying that the target would appear on either the left or right side of 604 
the screen, respectively. The cue was either 80% or 90% valid (i.e. accuracy in predicting the 605 
target location) and was presented during either the dominant (i.e. visible) or suppressed (i.e. 606 
invisible) phase of BR. They found that reaction times to the targets were significantly affected 607 
by cue validity only during the dominant phase but not during the suppressed phase. This 608 
implies that symbolic central cues, when rendered invisible, cannot direct top-down attention. It 609 
is unclear, however, whether this negative finding is due to ineffective guidance of attention (i.e. 610 
the cue is processed but not to the degree of serving as an effective cue), or due to ineffective 611 
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cue processing (i.e. the cue is not processed at all). If the latter account is correct, then the null 612 
attentional effect can be attributed to sensory analysis rather than attentional guidance per se. 613 
More studies are needed to clarify this issue, the critical test being specifying the processing 614 
levels of the cueing information.  615 
 616 
Since attention includes not only top-down attention, which was explored by Schall and 617 
colleagues (1993), but also bottom-up attention, it remains important to ask whether invisible 618 
information can “capture” attention in a bottom-up manner. At the cortical level, it is unclear 619 
whether suppressed information can activate the right ventral frontoparietal network, a critical 620 
network for bottom-up attention (Box 5). At the subcortical level, although it is also unclear 621 
whether the SC or the pulvinar are employed during suppression, there is some evidence that 622 
the amygdala, which is responsive to invisible fearful faces, is able to guide attention. For 623 
example, in the attentional blink (Raymond et al., 1992), when several stimuli are briefly 624 
displayed in sequence (i.e. rapid serial visual presentation), observers usually fail to detect a 625 
second target when it is presented 200-500ms after the first one; importantly, compared with 626 
normal stimuli, negative stimuli usually show a preferential ability to break through into 627 
awareness. In support of the current reasoning, it has been shown that the amygdala is 628 
important for such attenuation of the attentional blink. For example, when exposed to aversive 629 
words, patients with left anterior–medial temporal lesions or bilateral amygdala lesions failed to 630 
show attenuation of the attentional blink (Anderson and Phelps, 2001), implying a causal role of 631 
the amygdala or the anterior-medial temporal cortex in enhancing emotion-related information 632 
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processing. The amygdala’s ability to modulate the attentional blink may derive from its 633 
reception of the rapid and crude information from the pulvinar in the thalamus through the 634 
retinotectal pathway (Zald, 2003; see also 3.3 Face perception). Since suppressed fearful faces 635 
can activate the amygdala, it seems logical to speculate that some invisible emotional 636 
information might be able to attract attention automatically. Indeed, using invisible erotic 637 
pictures, a recent study by Jiang et al. (2006) lends support to this hypothesis. As illustrated in 638 
Figure 4, they presented participants with an erotic picture and a scrambled picture, both 639 
rendered invisible by CFS, next to the central fixation point, one on each side. To assess 640 
whether the invisible erotic picture could guide attention, they asked participants to indicate the 641 
perceived orientation (clockwise or counterclockwise) of a briefly presented Gabor patch 642 
following the presentation of the suppressed erotic images, which could be on the left or on the 643 
right (Figure 4a). The logic is, if the erotic picture can automatically capture attention, then 644 
participants should perform better when the Gabor patch is presented on the same (vs. different) 645 
side as the erotic picture. The difference between the two conditions can be used to index the 646 
amount of automatic attentional guidance (i.e. the implicit attentional effect). In other words, a 647 
positive attentional effect means that attention is attracted to the erotic picture, whereas a 648 
negative attentional effect means that attention is repelled from the erotic picture. Interestingly, 649 
they found that invisible erotic pictures could either attract or repel observers’ spatial attention 650 
depending on their gender and sexual orientation. Specifically, for heterosexual participants, 651 
attention was attracted to invisible erotic pictures of the opposite gender (and for males, 652 
attention was repelled from invisible erotic pictures of the same gender; Figure 4b). Gay males 653 
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were similar to heterosexual female participants in that they were attracted to male erotic 654 
pictures but not female erotic pictures. Bisexual females fell in-between the heterosexual male 655 
group and the heterosexual female group. This study thus reveals the power of invisible 656 
information in orienting attention, which is consistent with earlier studies including those 657 
showing 1) that exogenous cues rendered invisible by visual masking can capture attention 658 
(McCormick, 1997), and 2) that oriented Gabor patches, with such high spatial frequency that it 659 
is perceptually indistinguishable from a uniform field, can generate orientation-dependent 660 
spatial cueing effect (Rajimehr, 2004). It remains unclear what kind of information in the erotic 661 
pictures is responsible for orienting attention. According to the unconscious binding hypothesis, 662 
one possibility is that nude bodies in the erotic pictures, albeit invisible, increase arousal levels 663 
of the observers through feature binding. Future research is needed to specify the conditions 664 
that can generate top-down and bottom-up attention, and to reveal the neural mechanisms that 665 
support such implicit attentional guidance. 666 
 667 
[insert figure 4 about here] 668 
 669 
In short, although invisible dot cues fail to provide cueing effect, invisible erotic images can 670 
attract attention and boost performance in the locations where these images appear. Together 671 
with other studies using masking to show orienting of attention, these results provide evidence 672 
for the existence of implicit attention. According to the unconscious binding hypothesis, it is 673 
likely that binding of certain critical features in the invisible erotic images generates 674 
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representation of arousal value. How the brain binds these critical features and the exact 675 
mechanisms of attentional guidance by implicit information await future research.  676 
 677 
[insert box 5 about here] 678 
 679 
3.5. Attentional modulation of invisible information processing 680 
It is now clear that information rendered invisible by BR or CFS can be processed to several 681 
levels and functionally can guide attention. But what are the limits of such unconscious 682 
processing? In particular, is invisible information processing constrained by concurrent 683 
processing resources, or instead it is so automatic that it is not under the control of attention? 684 
 685 
There is no unified view regarding the relationship between attention and awareness. On the 686 
one hand, since both attention and awareness are selective in nature due to limited resources, 687 
some argue that they are identical (O'Regan and Noe, 2001; Posner, 1994). On the other hand, 688 
since we are able to attend to the locations of invisible images and can also become conscious 689 
of the gist of a scene in the near absence of attention, others maintain that attention and 690 
awareness can be dissociated (Koch and Tsuchiya, 2007; Lamme, 2003). To resolve this debate, 691 
it is necessary to address some conceptual issues. First, is attention necessary for awareness? At 692 
first glance this seems true (Dehaene et al., 2006): we become aware of what the paper is 693 
talking about only if we pay attention to it. To falsify this, we need to search for “awareness 694 
without attention”; the critical test is whether we can perceive an image without attention. This 695 
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is partly supported by a study showing that we can be aware of the gist of a scene almost 696 
without attention (Li et al., 2002). Second, is attention sufficient for awareness? It is obvious 697 
that attention is insufficient for awareness: we can attend to the locations of invisible 698 
information but still be unaware of it, as in CFS. Thus, it seems that attention is neither 699 
necessary nor sufficient for awareness. 700 
 701 
The dissociable relationship between attention and awareness provides conceptual grounds to 702 
ask how attention can modulate both aware and unaware visual processing. In aware condition, 703 
attention plays a critical role in determining the quality of representation of incoming 704 
information. On philosophical grounds, Block (2005) argues that awareness without attention is 705 
short-lived and vulnerable (“phenomenal awareness”), analogical to retinotopic fleeting 706 
memory (i.e. iconic memory for briefly presented visual stimuli); only with attention can 707 
awareness become stable and deep (“access awareness”), analogical to durable non-retinotopic 708 
memory (e.g. working memory). In neurobiological terms, when feedforward processing occurs 709 
among early visual areas, phenomenal awareness arises; only when recurrent interactions grow 710 
to include executive or mnemonic space (frontal, prefrontal, and temporal cortex) can access 711 
awareness take place (Lamme, 2003). In other words, recurrent interactions between higher 712 
brain areas and visual areas are necessary for awareness, with attention playing a critical role. 713 
 714 
In unaware condition, does attention still play a critical role in determining how much we can 715 
process? In other words, can invisible information processing be modulated by attention? The 716 
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critical test is to contrast invisible information processing under attended and unattended 717 
conditions (for a discussion of the distinction between unattended stimuli and irrelevant stimuli, 718 
see Box 6). A recent study with CFS (Kanai et al., 2006) suggests that spatial attention could 719 
not modulate the strength of the tilt AE induced by invisible adaptors, whereas feature-based 720 
attention could. However, because they manipulated spatial attention by instructing the 721 
observers to attend to one of the two spatial markers drawn on top of the Mondrian patterns, 722 
this may not be effective in optimizing unattended condition—attention in one spatial marker 723 
can still spill over to the other maker (Lavie, 1995; see also Box 6). Indeed, a recent study 724 
(Bahrami et al., 2007) made attentional load of the central task very high to deplete attentional 725 
resource available in each trial, such that little attention would spill over to the task-irrelevant 726 
distractors. Using such demanding task to load attention, they show that attention in the foveal 727 
task strongly modulated retinotopic activity in V1 evoked by invisible objects. However, in the 728 
same study attention failed to modulate V1 activity for noise stimuli used for CFS, making it 729 
difficult to interpret the positive results of attentional modulation of invisible objects. It thus 730 
remains unclear why attention fails to modulate neural activation for noise but succeeds in 731 
modulating neural activity of invisible objects. Future research should address whether and how 732 
attention dynamically modulates invisible information. For example, in the visual cortex, 733 
attentional modulation of visible stimuli increases from early to late processing stages, but 734 
attention effect in the LGN is larger than that in V1(Kastner and Pinsk, 2004). Whether this 735 
holds for invisible stimuli awaits empirical investigation. Interestingly, Bahrami et al. (2007) 736 
show that attentional modulation effect was larger in V1 than V2 or V3. The time is ripe for 737 
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further investigations. 738 
 739 
It thus appears that explicit attention can modulate invisible information processing. Several 740 
questions remain open though. In particular, it is unclear whether, and how, different cortical 741 
areas differ in sensitivity to attentional modulation during suppression. In addition, it is not 742 
known how different types of attention, such as space-based attention (i.e. attention to locations) 743 
and feature-based attention (i.e. attention to features), might show different modulation 744 
properties. We suspect that attention is necessary to unconscious binding; moreover, without 745 
attention, unconscious processing of features is not possible.  746 
 747 
[insert box 6 here] 748 
 749 
4. Conclusions 750 
Human mental life extends well beyond conscious experiences. Although much has been 751 
learned about BR, the mechanism of information processing during suppression remains elusive. 752 
To understand this mechanism, we must understand the depth of information processing during 753 
suppression at behavioral, neural, and theoretical levels. In this paper, we have advocated the 754 
unconscious binding hypothesis, that binding of invisible features are possible albeit susceptible 755 
to interference. Although this hypothesis is still in its infancy, the studies reviewed here provide 756 
important insights. First, low level features can be processed unconsciously with processing 757 
level modulated by awareness and attention. Second, high level representations of objects and 758 
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faces in the ventral visual areas are dramatically suppressed, but tools and emotional faces can 759 
still activate dorsal areas and the amygdale, respectively. Third, invisible information can serve 760 
as an implicit cue to guide attention, which we refer to “implicit attention”. Last, invisible 761 
information in turn can be modulated by external explicit attention. Understanding the 762 
mechanisms subserving invisible information processing will bring new insights into how the 763 
visual system operates without consciousness, as well as the neural correlates of consciousness 764 
in general.  765 
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Table 1  1263 
Level of unconscious processing during binocular rivalry (BR) and continuous flash 1264 
suppression (CFS) as measured by strength of aftereffect (AE) after adaptation  1265 
Type of adaptation Adaptor Level of processing 
Afterimages (AIs) Gray gratings during BR 
 
Color gratings during CFS 
Reduced strength (Gilroy 
& Blake, 2005) 
Reduced strength: the 
more completely the 
adaptor was suppressed, 
the more strongly the AI 
intensity was reduced 
(Tsuchiya & Koch, 2005) 
Tilt after-effects (TAEs) Gratings inclined 10 or 15° 
from the vertical during 
BR 
Full strength (Wade & 
Wenderoth, 1978) 
Spatial frequency 
aftereffects  
Square wave gratings 
during BR 
 
 
 
Full strength: Magnitude 
as measured by contrast 
threshold elevation and 
spatial frequency shift was 
determined solely by 
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Sinusoidal wave gratings 
during BR 
stimulus duration and 
independent of awareness 
(Blake & Fox, 1974) 
Full strength for 
high-contrast adaptors, 
reduced strength for 
low-contrast adaptors, as 
measured by contrast 
threshold elevation (Blake 
et al., 2006) 
Color aftereffects (CAEs) Color gratings during BR Full strength (White et al., 
1978) 
Motion aftereffects 
(MAEs) 
Translational motion 
during BR 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Full strength (Wade & 
Wenderoth, 1978); 
interocular transfer of the 
MAE is not reduced by 
awareness (O’Shea & 
Crassini, 1981); full 
strength for high-contrast 
adaptors, reduced strength 
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Rotating spiral during BR 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Drifting plaid during BR 
for low-contrast adaptors 
(Blake et al., 2006) 
Reduced strength: 
magnitude was 
proportional to the total 
duration of spiral visibility 
during adaptation 
(Wiesenfelder & Blake, 
1990);  
Reduced strength (van der 
Zwan et al., 1993) 
Note. For an introduction to adaptation, see Box 2; for definitions of the AEs mentioned, see 1266 
Box 3 1267 
 1268 
 1269 
 1270 
 1271 
 1272 
 1273 
 1274 
 1275 
N
at
ur
e 
Pr
ec
ed
in
gs
 : 
hd
l:1
01
01
/n
pr
e.
20
08
.2
24
6.
1 
: P
os
te
d 
29
 A
ug
 2
00
8
Page 64 of 86 
 
Box 1. Measures of awareness 1276 
The notion that consciousness reflects subjective experience is central to nearly all theories of 1277 
consciousness. On the other hand, the scientific quest for perception without awareness and its 1278 
neural correlates requires establishing objective unawareness of the stimuli. In fact, the lack of 1279 
an accepted measure of awareness has made any claim of perception without awareness 1280 
controversial. We believe that to be objective, measures should be both reliable and valid (cf. 1281 
Lovibond and Shanks, 2002). To be reliable, measures should not be contaminated by demand 1282 
characteristics (i.e. an experimental artifact where observers change their behavior to conform 1283 
to the experimenter’s expectations) or response bias (e.g. individual differences in reporting 1284 
thresholds). To be valid, measures should truly tap into the presumed theoretical construct of 1285 
awareness. In other words, assessment should be both relevant and sensitive to the question 1286 
being investigated; at the same time, assessment should be sensitive only to aware but not 1287 
unaware processes (Merikle and Reingold, 1992; Wiens and Ohman, 2002). 1288 
 1289 
In practice, measures of awareness can be classified into two types: subjective (e.g. self-report) 1290 
and objective (e.g. forced-choice). In subjective measurement, report of seeing (or not seeing) 1291 
the stimuli is taken as being aware (or unaware) of the stimuli; in objective measurement, better 1292 
than chance (or around chance) performance in discriminating between alternative stimuli is 1293 
regarded as being aware (or unaware) of the stimuli (Merikle et al., 2001). Subjective measures, 1294 
albeit intrinsic to the concept of awareness, are potentially confounded by response bias (Green 1295 
and Swets, 1966; Macmillan and Creelman, 1991): people who are under-confident tend to set 1296 
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up a high criterion and report stimuli invisible even when the stimuli are above visibility 1297 
thresholds, making it an unreliable measurement. Instead, forced-choice procedures, which 1298 
yield more criterion-independent measures of awareness, are routinely used in the quest for 1299 
neural correlates of awareness (Eriksen, 1960; Holender, 1986). At the same time, to preserve 1300 
the merits of subjective measures while avoiding confounds (e.g. subjective criteria), it is also 1301 
of merits to use signal detection theory to characterize behavioral performance with receiver 1302 
operating characteristic curves in detection task (Evans and Azzopardi, 2007; Kunimoto et al., 1303 
2001; Pessoa et al., 2005). In general, for studies strongly based on the prerequisite that the 1304 
stimuli are invisible, objective measures of awareness should be used. Moreover, validity issues 1305 
should be considered carefully. 1306 
 1307 
 1308 
 1309 
 1310 
 1311 
 1312 
 1313 
 1314 
 1315 
 1316 
 1317 
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Box 2. The neural mechanism of adaptation and its application in the quest for the neural 1318 
correlates of consciousness 1319 
Sensory systems are constantly adapting to changes in the environment and adjusting their 1320 
sensitivities accordingly. In fact, it is such a ubiquitous property that it occurs at multiple stages 1321 
of processing and has been studied with multiple techniques, ranging from psychophysics to 1322 
single unit recordings (Miller et al., 1991) and fMRI (Buckner et al., 1998). When measured 1323 
with psychophysics, visual adaptation refers to the phenomenon that prolonged exposure to a 1324 
visual stimulus (i.e. adaptor) alters the visual system’s sensitivity to, or the appearance of a 1325 
subsequent related stimulus (i.e. test), with the altered appearance called visual aftereffect (AE). 1326 
When measured with fMRI, adaptation refers to the observation of decreased neural activity for 1327 
repeated versus novel stimuli (i.e. fMRI adaptation; for reviews see Krekelberg et al., 2006; Lin, 1328 
2007). Specifically, adaptation is termed pattern adaptation if an effective pattern (e.g. tilt) 1329 
serves as an adaptor to reduce the responsiveness to a subsequent test, and termed contrast 1330 
adaptation if an effective contrast image (usually a high contrast one) serves as an adaptor to 1331 
reduce contrast sensitivity to a subsequent test. A special category of AE, called afterimage (AI), 1332 
does not require a particular test to observe the effect; in other words, an image continues to 1333 
appear in one's vision after the original image has ceased. 1334 
 1335 
What is the neural mechanism of adaptation? Generally, adaptation to bright environment and 1336 
dark environment (i.e. light adaptation and dark adaptation, respectively) is believed to occur 1337 
entirely in the retina (Shapley and Enroth-Cugell, 1984). Similarly, negative AI (see also Box 3f) 1338 
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is largely attributed to retinal mechanisms with some contributions of post-retinal process (e.g. 1339 
Shimojo et al., 2001). Yet, there are at least two reasons to believe that, in general, AE due to 1340 
pattern and contrast adaptation is mainly a cortical phenomenon with some limited subcortical 1341 
contributions (for a review, see Graham, 1989). First, AE in one eye affects response to 1342 
un-adapted stimulus presented to the other eye (Gibson, 1937), implying a binocular 1343 
mechanism. Although neurons in the lateral geniculate nucleus (LGN) display interocular 1344 
transfer of information (e.g. with their receptive field surrounds, McClurkin and Marrocco, 1345 
1984; Sillito et al., 1994), and the LGN is reciprocally connected to other thalamic nuclei that 1346 
contain binocular neurons (e.g. the perigeniculate nucleus, Steriade and Deschenes, 1984), 1347 
excitatory binocular processing within the geniculocortical pathway occurs first in primary 1348 
visual cortex (V1, Hubel, 1960). Second, AE is orientation specific such that a horizontal 1349 
adapting grating does not influences the threshold or the apparent spatial frequency of vertical 1350 
test gratings (Blakemore and Nachmias, 1971). Critically, orientation selectivity and tuning is 1351 
not found before V1 (Hubel and Wiesel, 1962, 1968). Thus, AE has been used to infer the 1352 
properties of cortical feature analyzers (Gibson and Radner, 1937). On the other hand, AE does 1353 
have some subcortical mechanisms. For instance, most neurons in the LGN still show 1354 
adaptation to contrasts of drifting sinusoidal gratings, albeit to a lesser degree than neurons in 1355 
visual cortex (Ohzawa et al., 1985). More strikingly, a recent study of the macaque monkeys 1356 
found that magnocellular (but not parvocellular) LGN neurons showed strong contrast 1357 
adaptation that originated in the ganglion cells, pushing the mechanisms of contrast adaptation 1358 
to subcortical pathways (Solomon et al., 2004; but see Mante et al., 2005). That said, spatial 1359 
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frequency specific contrast adaptation and presumably other types of pattern specific visual 1360 
adaptation is still believed to origin in V1 (Duong and Freeman, 2007), which is selective for 1361 
visual features such as orientation, direction, position, and speed. For example, it has been 1362 
shown that neural activity in V1 is substantially reduced after a few seconds of visual 1363 
stimulation with an effective pattern, which is thought to be the neural substrate of a variety of 1364 
perceptual AE. Similarly, motion adaptation in motion area V5 (Culham et al., 1999; He et al., 1365 
1998; Theoret et al., 2002; Tootell et al., 1995) and early visual areas (V1, V2 and V3, which 1366 
possess direction-selective neurons, Huk et al., 2001) are thought to be responsible for motion 1367 
AE.  1368 
 1369 
Based on its neural underpinnings, adaptation, ‘‘the psychologist’s microelectrode’’ (Frisby, 1370 
1979), acts as a probe for inferring the relative contributions of V1 and other visual areas in 1371 
visual awareness (e.g. orientation-selective adaptation, He et al., 1996; He and MacLeod, 2001). 1372 
Specifically, when similar or equal strength of adaptation is found for visible and invisible 1373 
inputs, neural correlates of such unperturbed adaptation are inferred as uncorrelated with visual 1374 
awareness. 1375 
 1376 
 1377 
 1378 
 1379 
 1380 
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Box 3. The variety of visual aftereffects 1381 
There are numerous kinds of visual aftereffects (AEs). Throughout this article, we mention 1382 
several of them in the context of binocular rivalry (BR) and continuous flash suppression (CFS). 1383 
Understanding these AEs is important to appreciate how they serve as tools in probing the depth 1384 
of unconscious processing. Toward that end, we describe several important AEs below in order 1385 
of their appearance in the text. In addition, we have prepared a webpage with demonstrations. 1386 
The URL for that webpage is http://zhichenglin.googlepages.com/demonstrations. 1387 
 1388 
1. Tilt aftereffect (TAE) 1389 
Prolonged adaptation to an oriented visual stimulus causes a subsequent image to appear 1390 
repulsed away from the adapting orientation (Gibson and Radner, 1937). For example, after 1391 
prolonged viewing of an inclined grating, a vertically presented test grating appears as tilted in 1392 
the opposite direction. It also occurs after adaptation to illusory contour tilt (Paradiso et al., 1393 
1989). TAE is believed to occur as a result of altered patterns of activity in orientation-selective 1394 
neurons in V1 and V2, most likely due to inhibitory interactions (Blakemore et al., 1970; 1395 
Carpenter and Blakemore, 1973; Magnussen and Kurtenbach, 1980a, b; Morrone et al., 1982; 1396 
Wenderoth and Johnstone, 1987).  1397 
 1398 
2. Spatial frequency aftereffect  1399 
This comes in two forms: contrast threshold elevation and spatial frequency shift. Contrast 1400 
threshold elevation is measured in contrast sensitivity function (CSF, Blakemore and Campbell, 1401 
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1969). CSF is determined by finding the contrast threshold (i.e. the minimal amount of contrast 1402 
needed to make a grating look striped) at different spatial frequencies; a typical finding is that 1403 
the threshold is lowest (i.e. sensitivity is highest) at intermediate spatial frequencies, around 4 1404 
to 5 cycles per degree of visual angle. After prolonged exposure to a high contrast grating of a 1405 
particular spatial frequency, more contrast is required (i.e. contrast threshold is elevated) to be 1406 
able to detect a grating of the same spatial frequency than before adaptation, with contrast 1407 
thresholds for quite different spatial frequencies being unaffected. In other words, the minimal 1408 
intensity difference between light and dark bars to enable detection of a grating is elevated. This 1409 
is called contrast threshold elevation and occurs only for gratings similar to the adapting pattern 1410 
in orientation. On the other hand, spatial frequency shift (Blakemore and Sutton, 1969) refers to 1411 
the finding that prolonged adaptation to a high-contrast grating causes a subsequent grating 1412 
shift away from the adapting spatial frequency—a grating with spatial frequency higher (or 1413 
lower) than that of the adaptor appear with even higher (or lower) spatial frequency than it 1414 
actually is. The AE is generally accepted as due to neural activity in V1/V2 (De Valois et al., 1415 
1982; Maffei and Fiorentini, 1973). 1416 
 1417 
3. Orientation-contingent color aftereffect (a.k.a. the McCollough effect)  1418 
In the McCollough effect (McCollough, 1965), prolonged exposure to a pair of colored gratings 1419 
(e.g. a vertical green grating and a horizontal red grating) causes a pair of colorless gratings 1420 
appear tinged with the opposite color contingent on the orientation of the adapting gratings and 1421 
the test gratings (e.g. the vertical grating appears reddish whereas the horizontal grating appears 1422 
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greenish). The AE can last for a long time, but it requires a period of adaptation to manifest. 1423 
Although its exact neural mechanisms are still disputed, accumulating evidence suggests that 1424 
they might be located early in the cortical visual pathways, probably in V1 (e.g. Humphrey and 1425 
Goodale, 1998; but see Siegel and Allan, 1992 for an associative learning explanation). 1426 
 1427 
4. Motion aftereffect (MAE) 1428 
Prolonged adaptation to a regularly moving stimulus renders a subsequent physically stationary 1429 
test pattern to appear to move in the opposite direction (Addams, 1834; Mather et al., 1998). 1430 
Known as MAE, it usually comes in several forms. One type is called the translational (i.e. 1431 
linear) MAE. A well know example is the waterfall illusion: prolonged viewing of a waterfall 1432 
makes subsequent stationary rocks besides the fall appear moving upward. Whether the 1433 
translational MAE reflects low-level or high-level motion mechanisms depends on the nature of 1434 
the test pattern: MAE measured with a dynamic test pattern is considered to reflect higher 1435 
stages of motion processing than MAE measured with a static test pattern (Fang and He, 2004; 1436 
Nishida et al., 1997). Another type of MAE is the spiral AE (Plateau, 1849): after adaptation to 1437 
a rotating spiral, a subsequent stationary spiral (or other stationary patterns) appears to move in 1438 
the opposite directions. Still another type of MAE is plaid-induced MAE: motion stimuli 1439 
composed of moving gratings of different orientations are perceived as a coherent plaid pattern 1440 
moving in a single direction and speed. Prolonged exposure to such moving plaid pattern can 1441 
also generate MAE similar to translational MAE. A related type of MAE is the transparent 1442 
MAE: bivectorial motion stimuli composed of two sets of randomly positioned dots moving in 1443 
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different directions and at different speeds are perceived as two overlapping surfaces moving 1444 
transparently over each other (however, if the dots are locally paired, the two dot fields are not 1445 
segmented into two separate surfaces but perceived as a single surface moving with the vector 1446 
average velocity of the two component vectors, Qian et al., 1994; Snowden and Verstraten, 1447 
1999). Adaptation to such transparent motion results in a direction inverse of the vector sum of 1448 
both inducing patterns (Riggs and Day, 1980; Verstraten et al., 1994). In general, the neural 1449 
mechanisms of MAE include area V5 (Culham et al., 1999; He et al., 1998; Theoret et al., 2002; 1450 
Tootell et al., 1995) and early visual areas (V1, V2 and V3, which possess direction-selective 1451 
neurons, Huk et al., 2001).  1452 
 1453 
5. Square-wave illusion aftereffect 1454 
In a triangular-wave spatial luminance grating, the locations of peak luminance appear as thin, 1455 
bright stripes, with luminance falling off gradually and symmetrically on both sides of these 1456 
peaks. After a few moments of adaptation, however, alternating light and dark illusory bars 1457 
appear to be illuminated from either the right or left, resembling a square-wave grating with 1458 
rounded edges (Leguire et al., 1981). In other words, adaptation renders a triangular-wave 1459 
grating to appear like a square-wave grating. It may reflect the operation of cortical 1460 
phase-selective mechanisms. 1461 
 1462 
6. Negative afterimages 1463 
After exposure to an image, an illusory percept continues to appear in one's vision although the 1464 
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original one has ceased (Craik, 1940). Known as afterimage (AI), it usually comes in two types: 1465 
positive AI and negative AI. In positive AI, bright areas remain bright and dark areas remain 1466 
dark; in negative AI, however, bright areas turn dark and dark areas turn bright. Much research 1467 
has been done in negative AI. Similar to color AE, if the adaptor is a saturated color, then 1468 
adaptation to it will generate an illusory percept of the complementary color at a uniform gray 1469 
field. Unlike color AE, however, most AI lasts for only a few seconds to a minute: positive AI, 1470 
thought to be associated with retinal latency, last only for tens of milliseconds; negative AI, 1471 
attributed to photoreceptor fatigue due to photopigment bleaching, can last longer (e.g. tens of 1472 
seconds). Negative AI is largely due to retinal mechanisms with some contributions of 1473 
post-retinal process (e.g. Shimojo et al., 2001). 1474 
 1475 
 1476 
 1477 
 1478 
 1479 
 1480 
 1481 
 1482 
 1483 
 1484 
 1485 
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Box 4. The parvocellular and magnocellular pathways 1486 
Anatomically, the parvo and magno cells in the lateral geniculate nucleus (LGN) originate from 1487 
morphologically distinct retinal ganglion cells, midget cells and parasol cells, respectively 1488 
(Perry et al., 1984). Coincidentally, the first letters of parvo and magno cells and their 1489 
corresponding midget and parasol cells are in exact reverse. So, a potential confusion is that 1490 
when one refers to the M system it is unclear whether one is referring to the midget or magno 1491 
cell. The convention is to use P and M to refer to parvo and magno, respectively. The names of 1492 
the channels derive from the relative sizes of the cells in the segregated laminae of the dorsal 1493 
LGN (dLGN) to which they project—P cells have small cell bodies, thin axons, and slow 1494 
axonal conduction speed, whereas M cells have large cell bodies, thick axons, and fast axonal 1495 
conduction speed (Schiller and Malpeli, 1978). The P and M pathways are segregated in the 1496 
LGN between its four dorsal layers and two ventral layers, respectively. This segregation 1497 
continues up to primary visual cortex (V1), with the P pathway terminating primarily in layers 1498 
4A and 4Cß and the M pathway in layer 4Cα and 6 (Fitzpatrick et al., 1985). The P and M 1499 
pathways are preferentially associated the ventral and dorsal cortical pathways, respectively; 1500 
however, they are not confined exclusively to either pathway (Felleman and Van Essen, 1991; 1501 
Merigan and Maunsell, 1993). For example, visual cortical area 4 (V4), including its ventral 1502 
and dorsal parts (Hansen et al., 2007), receives a mixed input from both the M and P systems. 1503 
Besides these geniculo-striate pathways, it should be noted that the dorsal stream, especially the 1504 
posterior parietal cortex (Pare and Wurtz, 1997), also receives visual input from the superior 1505 
colliculus (SC) through the pulvinar (i.e. a subcortical projection).  1506 
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 1507 
Functionally, the P pathway is color sensitive, is tuned to higher spatial frequencies, is sensitive 1508 
to lower temporal frequencies, and has lower contrast sensitivity; the M channel responds very 1509 
poorly to isoluminant stimuli, even when moving, but is responsive to lower spatial frequencies, 1510 
is sensitive to higher temporal frequencies, and has higher contrast sensitivity (Schiller and 1511 
Malpeli, 1978). Thus, a common strategy to preferentially activate either pathway is to 1512 
stimulate the P pathway with stimuli that are defined in color or have high spatial frequency, 1513 
and the M pathway with stimuli that have low contrast or spatial frequency. However, it should 1514 
be noted that in reality responses of the two pathways to most visual stimuli overlap 1515 
significantly; one has to go to the very extremes of the response spectrum to get good 1516 
differential activation. Additionally, although P cells have low contrast sensitivity, a high 1517 
contrast stimulus will not activate them preferentially (M cells respond well to high contrasts). 1518 
Similarly, low temporal frequencies or high luminance (rather than isoluminant) stimuli will not 1519 
evoke preferential activation of P cells (the M system has high sensitivity and it continues to 1520 
respond to isoluminance at low spatial frequencies albeit at a reduced rate). Moreover, stimuli 1521 
that may preferentially activate individual P or M cells do not necessarily preferentially activate 1522 
the P or M cell populations as a whole. For example, although individual P cells have lower 1523 
contrast sensitivity than individual M cells, collectively they match the performance of M cells 1524 
because there are so many more of them. For this reason, an M-cell lesion will not reduce 1525 
behavioral contrast sensitivity (J. H. R. Maunsell, personal communication, December 10, 1526 
2007). 1527 
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Box 5. Selective attention in the brain 1528 
Efficient computation of perceptual priority is a hallmark of adaptive behavior for at least two 1529 
reasons. First, while sensory inputs are massive, attention capacity is limited. Competition for 1530 
limited representational resources calls for a gating mechanism to prioritize relevant information 1531 
and thus reduce information overload. Such competition is biased not only by sensory saliency, 1532 
whose weight decreases in the neural hierarchy, but also by visual attention, whose weight 1533 
increases in the hierarchy (Kastner and Pinsk, 2004; O'Connor et al., 2002; Serences and Yantis, 1534 
2006). Second, to interpret sensory inputs, it is necessary to first assign features to either figure 1535 
or ground and then integrate multiple features across space and time for perceptual coherence. 1536 
This is further constrained by the distinct preferences of neurons in the hierarchy: neurons in 1537 
early visual areas respond to small areas of visual space (receptive fields, RFs) and code simple 1538 
features (e.g. orientation and spatial frequency), whereas neurons in later areas have large RFs 1539 
and code more complex features. Attention serves to integrate distributed neural representations 1540 
of features to form coherent object representations (Treisman, 1996). Two distinct forms of 1541 
attention subserve such adaptive behavior. A knock on the door, for example, may distract you 1542 
from focusing on the paper; or you may decide to check the time since a meeting is coming up. 1543 
The former, that salient events (e.g. transient changes in luminance or contrast) capture attention, 1544 
is termed bottom-up (or transient /stimulus-driven/exogenous/reflexive) attention; the latter, that 1545 
goal and expectation drives attention, is dubbed top-down (or 1546 
sustained/goal-driven/endogenous/voluntary) attention. Although orienting of attention is usually 1547 
accompanied by eye movements (i.e. overt attention), covert orienting of attention without eye 1548 
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movements is possible especially in laboratory settings (Posner, 1980). 1549 
 1550 
Given its important role in performing a variety of tasks, it won’t be surprising that attention is 1551 
not a single entity, but a set of cortical and subcortical processes that interact mutually. First, at 1552 
the cortical level, the source of top-down and bottom-up attention is generally believed to 1553 
comprise two networks: 1) top-down attention originates from the dorsal posterior parietal cortex 1554 
(e.g. the intraparietal sulcus) and the frontal cortex (e.g. the frontal eye field), forming the 1555 
so-called dorsal frontoparietal network; 2) bottom-up attention stems from the temporoparietal 1556 
junction and the ventral frontal cortex (largely lateralized to the right hemisphere), constituting 1557 
the so-called ventral frontoparietal network (Corbetta and Shulman, 2002). Second, at the 1558 
subcortical level, several regions have been identified to be important for control of attention. 1559 
For example, the visual grasp reflex—reflexively orienting the eyes toward salient events in the 1560 
visual periphery—is supported by the phylogenetically primitive midbrain circuits in all 1561 
vertebrates (Ingle, 1973). Later studies pinpointed that the superior colliculus (SC) in the 1562 
midbrain and the pulvinar in the thalamus are important for both overt and covert attention. 1563 
Specifically, retinal projection to the SC is critical for attentional orienting and involuntary 1564 
capture of attention (Rafal et al., 1991). Besides, the amygdala also plays an important role in 1565 
orienting attention by projecting to cholinergic and noradrenergic cells, which are capable of 1566 
exerting widespread effects on attention (Aston-Jones et al., 1999), and to cells in cortical 1567 
sensory regions (Amaral et al., 1992). Third, the cortical and subcortical attention networks 1568 
interact a lot; attentional selectivity can be achieved through an orchestration of subcortical 1569 
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reflex circuits by cortical processes that can activate or inhibit them (Easton, 1973). Indeed, 1570 
anatomically the subcortical and cortical attention areas are inter- and intra-connected. For 1571 
instance, the SC receives direct descending inputs from cortical visual areas and the dorsal 1572 
frontoparietal network; it returns its outputs through numerous thalamic sites including the visual 1573 
components of the thalamus (e.g. the LGN and the pulvinar). On the other hand, the pulvinar 1574 
(especially its ventral division) receives its major inputs from the visual cortex and returns its 1575 
total outputs to the cortex, serving as a hub for cortico-cortical communication (for a review, see 1576 
Shipp, 2004). Note that the dorsal pulvinar (similar to the “medial pulvinar” of histological brain 1577 
atlases) has connections with the cingulate, frontal, and (auditory) superior temporal areas, so its 1578 
range of inputs is probably just as diverse as those to the SC (S. Shipp, personal communication, 1579 
December 11, 2007). 1580 
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Box 6. Unattended versus irrelevant stimuli 1591 
In attention literature, it is crucial to distinguish unattended stimuli from irrelevant 1592 
stimuli—irrelevant stimuli are not necessarily unattended. This makes it important to consider 1593 
whether manipulation of selective attention is adequate to render irrelevant stimuli truly 1594 
unattended. For example, in a typical attention task where observers have to identify the central 1595 
target while ignoring the distractors on the side (which can be compatible or incompatible with 1596 
the target in terms of response), several steps should be considered to make attentional selection 1597 
efficient (Lachter et al., 2004; Miller, 1991; Yantis and Johnston, 1990):  1598 
 1599 
1) The location where the target appears should be certain (e.g. a 100% valid pre-cue and a 1600 
fixation marker of the target location will be helpful).  1601 
2) The location where the target appears, while always made clear to the observers such as 1602 
through pre-cueing, may vary from trial to trial to reduce observers’ tendency to explore new, 1603 
unattended objects (Posner and Cohen, 1984).  1604 
3) Abrupt onsets of the target and distractors should be controlled because abrupt onsets can 1605 
capture attention (Yantis and Jonides, 1984).  1606 
4) Grouping of the target and distractors (e.g. close proximity, common onset, and similar 1607 
appearance) should be minimized because attention can be allocated to the entire grouped 1608 
object (Duncan, 1984). 1609 
5) Duration of the distractors should be short (e.g. the distractors can be briefly presented and 1610 
then masked) because observers tend to attend to the whole space of a scene if time allows and 1611 
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long duration will result in more unconsumed attentional capacity  1612 
6) Perceptual load of target processing should be high enough to prevent involuntary spillover 1613 
of unconsumed attentional capacity (Lavie, 1995). 1614 
7) The target and distractors should be equally crowded (e.g. present stimuli in a circle), since 1615 
stimuli at the beginning and end of an array are more salient than others (Flom et al., 1963). 1616 
8) Stimuli should be separated by more than 1° due to the limited resolution of attention. 1617 
9) The target-response mapping may vary to prevent automatic mapping due to practice, which 1618 
does not use attentional resources (Schneider and Shiffrin, 1977).  1619 
 1620 
In particular, the load theory (Lavie, 1995, 2005), as described in item 6, specifies how capacity 1621 
limitation determines the level of distractor processing, and serves as a powerful paradigm to 1622 
render irrelevant stimuli as either unattended or involuntarily attended while keeping distractors 1623 
constant across different conditions. The key tenet is that as long as the central task does not 1624 
consume all or most of the available capacity, you cannot but process the distractors (e.g. Volker 1625 
et al., under review). Importantly, however, when steps like those listed above are considered to 1626 
optimize selection efficiency, it is possible to render irrelevant stimuli unattended (as indexed 1627 
by minimal processing of distractors) even under low perceptual load condition (Lachter et al., 1628 
2004).  1629 
 1630 
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Figure Captions 1633 
Figure 1. Schematic of (a) binocular rivalry (BR) and (b) continuous flash suppression (CFS): 1634 
two dissimilar images (panel “Stimulus”) are projected to each of two eyes through a mirror 1635 
stereoscope (c); the left eye receives an image different from what the right eye receives. The 1636 
two images compete with each other, resulting in alternative percepts during BR, or constant 1637 
percept of random noise during CFS (panel “Percept”).  1638 
 1639 
Figure 2. How contrast of adaptors modulates awareness-dependent adaptation. (a) 1640 
Compressive nonlinearity of contrast-aftereffect function: aftereffect (AE) strength saturates at 1641 
moderate to high contrast levels. (b) Rival stimuli used in threshold elevation AE and motion 1642 
AE experiments. (c) Static motion AE duration in different viewing conditions at two adapting 1643 
contrast levels (low vs. high). (d) Threshold elevation AE in different viewing conditions at two 1644 
adapting contrast levels (low vs. high). Error bars indicate SEM. Adapted from Blake et al., 1645 
2006. 1646 
Figure 3. Cortical responses to invisible tools and faces in the human dorsal and ventral 1647 
pathways. (a) Continuous flash suppression paradigm: in the invisible condition, objects (or 1648 
scrambled objects, serving as a baseline) were rendered invisible by dynamic, high-contrast, 1649 
random textures presented to the dominant eye (shown); in the visible condition, high contrast 1650 
dynamic noise was replaced by blank field (not shown). (b) Object-sensitive areas: V3A/V7, 1651 
intraparietal sulcus (IPS) in the dorsal pathway and the lateral occipital complex (LOC), temporal 1652 
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object areas in the ventral pathway. (c) Results for images of objects: Time courses of the average 1653 
blood oxygen level dependent (BOLD) signals (percentage change) from dorsal and ventral 1654 
object sensitive areas in 'visible' (gray curves) and 'invisible' (black curves) conditions. (d) 1655 
Results for images of faces and tools: The average percentage change in BOLD signal from the 1656 
dorsal object-sensitive areas in both the 'visible' and 'invisible' conditions. Error bars indicate 1657 
SEM. Adapted from Fang and He, 2005. 1658 
Figure 4. Attentional guidance by invisible erotic pictures. (a) Orientation task: participants were 1659 
asked to indicate the perceived orientation (clockwise or counterclockwise) of a briefly presented 1660 
Gabor patch. In the invisible condition, erotic pictures were rendered invisible by noise patches 1661 
presented to the dominant eye (shown); in the visible condition, the noise patches was replaced 1662 
by the same pair of intact and scrambled pictures (not shown). (b) Results for heterosexual male 1663 
(Left) and heterosexual female (Right) observers: the attentional effect was defined by the 1664 
accuracy difference between the erotic (i.e. when the Gabor patch was presented on the side of 1665 
the erotic picture) and the scrambled (i.e. when the Gabor patch was presented on the side of the 1666 
scrambled picture) conditions. Thus, a positive attentional effect suggested that attention was 1667 
attracted to the erotic picture, whereas a negative attentional effect suggested that attention was 1668 
repelled from the erotic picture. Same gender means that the gender of the picture is the same as 1669 
the observers; whereas opposite gender means otherwise. * indicates P < 0.05; ** indicates P < 1670 
0.0001; error bars indicate SEM. Adapted from Jiang et al., 2006. 1671 
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Figure 4 1710 
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